From  theos, “God,” and  dikee, “justice”; a term used to refer to attempts to justify the ways of God to man. A successful theodicy resolves the problem of evil for a theological system and demonstrates that God is all-powerful, all-loving, and just, despite evil’s existence.

Nature of Theodicies.

Six basic points are relevant to the nature of a theodicy.

(1) A theodicy is a response to a problem of the logical consistency of a theological position. Most attacks on theistic systems charge that their key theological claims, e.g., God is omnipotent, God is all-loving, and evil exists in a world created by God, taken together are self-contradictory. The theodicist’s task is to structure an answer which demonstrates that these propositions taken together are logically consistent. It should be noted that the theodicist is required to demonstrate only that there is no contradiction in his own theological position given his own views of God and evil. It is irrelevant if the critic objects on the grounds that the theodicy incorporates intellectual commitments about God and evil that he does not accept, for the theodicist needs only to demonstrate that his theology squares with itself. This means also that the theodocist must not structure a defense of God incorporating propositions that produce internal inconsistency.

(2) A successfully theodicy must be relevant to the problem of evil it addresses, and there are many variations: moral, evil, physical evil, the problem of an individual’s relation to God in view of experiencing specific evil, as well as problems of the degree and intensity of evil. The theodicist must construct a system relevant to the problem of evil confronting him. One cannot, e.g., answer the problem of natural evil by an appeal to the free will of human beings. Free human action is irrelevant to the occurrence of earthquakes and droughts. On the other hand, free human action is relevant to the problem of moral evil, a problem about evil produced at the hands of moral agents.

(3) A theodicy must be relevant to the specific theology it addresses, and not all theologies, even within the sphere of orthodox Christian theism, hold identical positions concerning God and evil. Each theological position incorporates a particular concept of divine benevolence, divine power, the nature of evil, and the nature of free human action. The theodicist must construct a defense of God’s ways as they are portrayed in his theological system. The free will defense, e.g., is an inappropriate answer to the problem of moral evil that faces a Calvinistic theology, since the notion of freedom involved in the free will defense (incompatibilism) contradicts the notion of freedom involved in a Calvinistic system (compatibilism).

(4) The problem of evil in its various forms is always a problem of logical consistency, and as such is intellectually interesting only for theologies that incorporate a notion of God’s omnipotence according to which he may do any logically consistent thing. If one holds, e.g., that God can do anything whatsoever, even actualize contradictions, then there is no sense in talking about the logical consistency. Most, if not all, theodicies are structured for theological positions that interpret God’s omnipotence as the ability to do the logically consistent.

(5) Most theodicies (and systems of ethics in general) adopt a particular axiom with regard to moral agency and moral blameworthiness; viz., that a person is not morally responsible for that which he cannot do or which he does under constraint or compulsion.

(6) The pattern of most theodicies is indicated by the preceding principles. They attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction by arguing that God, in spite of his omnipotence, cannot remove evil. Since he cannot remove evil, he is not morally responsible for its presence in the world. Such an argument rests on the concept of God’s omnipotence according to which God can do only the logically consistent. The strategy is to specify something that God does accomplish — a value of the first order — which he could not do if he were to remove evil. The free will defender argues, e.g., that God cannot accomplish two ends simultaneously — give man free will and remove evil — without contradicting his intentions to do one or the other. Since God cannot do both simultaneously, he is not guilty of the evil present in the world, for no moral agent is guilty for failing to do that which he could not do.

Views of Theodicy.

Several interesting theodicies have been offered by well-known thinkers for the moral problem of evil.

Gottfried Leibniz’s Theodicy

Gottfried Leibniz’s theodicy was structured for his extreme rationalistic theological system. Accordingly, there are not only reasons that God does whatever he does, but such reasons are necessary laws. These reasons are discernible by the light of pure reason [RC1] unaided by revelation.

Moreover, for Leibniz, God is the only metaphysically necessary being. There are an infinite number of contingent finite possible worlds God could actualize, but there is only one that is the best possible world. God is obligated to create the best.

In addition to this metaphysic, Leibniz’s system has its own concept of ethics: “good” and “evil” are pros hen^[1] equivocal terms whose primary sense is a metaphysical one. All other senses of “good” and “evil” relate to this primary one. Metaphysical evil is finitude or lack of being, and metaphysical good is plenitude of being. Moral goodness in God consists therefore in willing the best, metaphysically speaking. For such a theological system the problem of evil arises as follows: If it can be shown that God has willed less than the best world, metaphysically speaking, then God is shown not to be a good God. However, if it can be shown that God has willed the best metaphysically, then he is morally praiseworthy, despite the presence of moral and physical evil in the world.

In response, Leibniz argues that God always operates on the basis of sufficient reason, i.e., God will not do something without a sufficient reason (discernible by pure reason). In the case of actualizing a world, the reason for choosing one over another is that it is best.

Leibniz’s system demands that there be a best possible world. Moreover, God, the supremely rational being, knows what that world is, and being all-powerful, he can actualize it. Since he is all-good, he is inclined to do so, and in fact has actualized the best of all possible worlds. Of course, the metaphysically richest world must contain the greatest number and variety of beings, but that means that a world with moral and physical good and evil is richer metaphysically than a world with only moral and physical good. Thus, since God is obligated to create the best, and since Leibniz explains that he has, we can see that the best of all possible worlds, metaphysically speaking, must contain moral and physical evil. If God had refused to create such a world, however, he would be morally reprehensible, for his supreme moral obligation is to create the best world. The existence of moral and physical evil in the world God actualized is justified, then, and God is shown to be just, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.

Given the basic tenets of this system, Leibniz does not contradict himself with his theodicy. Consequently, he has solved his problem of evil, a problem of internal consistency. One may reject his theodicy and his theology, but not on grounds that it fails to remove the alleged contradiction.

Free Will Theodicies

Other well-known theodicies rest upon a modified rationalistic theology. Such a metaphysic lies behind the free will defense, the basic theodicy in the Augustinian tradition of theodicy; and also behind the soul-building theodicy, the basic theodicy in the Irenaean tradition.

There are four basic points here.

(1)   In a modified rationalists’ universe, God is not obligated to create any world, for his own existence is the supreme good.

(2)   Creating a world is a fitting thing for God to do, but not the only fitting thing for him to do. Whatever he chooses to do is done on the basis of reason, but such reasons are not necessary laws in this universe.

(3)   There is an infinite number of finite contingent possible worlds. Some by their very nature are inherently evil, so God could not create them. However, there is more than one good possible world which God could have created. There is no such thing as a best possible world.

(4)   God was free with respect to whether or not he should create and with respect to which of the good possible worlds he would create, if he chose to create.

For such a theological position, the problem of evil arises as follows: Is the contingent possible world that God created one of the good possible worlds (despite the evil in it)? The modified rationalist theologian must specify a reason that this world is one of those good possible worlds.

There is a basic ethic behind modified rationalistic theologies. The notion of evil and good presupposed by a free will defense is some form of nonconsequentialism^[2], i.e., good and evil are not determined on the basis of the consequences of the act. In regard to the problem of evil, this means that the world as created from the hand of God must not contain any evil and that evil in the world has been introduced by the actions of agents whom God created.

Soul-building theodicies follow a consequentialist account of ethics in which the good or evil of an act is determined by its results. The world as created from the hand of God did contain evil, but that causes no stain on God, since he will ultimately use evil to bring good.

The theodicist using the free will defense begins by pointing out that God is not the cause of evil in the world; the abuse of human free will is. Then, the question is whether God is not guilty for giving man free will when he knew that man could abuse it to commit evil. The answer is no. Free will is a value of the highest order, which God should have given. However, God is not the one who uses such free will to commit evil; man does, so man is responsible for evil. Moreover, God is still good for giving man something which he could, and in fact did, abuse because a world in which there are significantly free beings (even though they produce evil) is a far better world than one that contains no evil but is populated by automatons. In other words, God cannot both create significantly free beings and make it the case that they always freely do good. [RC2] On the free will defender’s account of free human action, if God makes it the case that man does anything, man cannot do it freely. Genuine free will, then, involves evil, but God is justified in what he did, for free will is a good that far overbalances any evil produced by the use of such a will.

Note that (1) if the free will defender is granted his concepts of God, evil, and free human action (and he must be, given the nature of a problem of evil), he can answer his problem of evil. His system is internally consistent. He has proved that this world is one of those good possible worlds God could have created. (2) The theodicy follows the basic strategy outlined previously. The free will defender holds to divine omnipotence, but argues that it means God can do whatever is logically consistent. The free will defender then argues that God was faced with two choices, neither of which could be actualized simultaneously with the other. God had the choice of either making man free or removing evil. He chose the former, and the good produced by such a choice far overbalances the evil man can and does produce with free will. However, God is not guilty for evil that remains in the world, for, having given man free will, God cannot remove that evil, and no one is guilty for failing to do what he could not do.

Soul-Building Theodicy

Soul-building theodicy also rests on a modified rationalist theology, but it incorporates a consequentialist ethic. The most noteworthy form of this view in recent years is that of John Hick, who begins by suggesting that Gods intent in creating man was not to create a perfect creature, but rather to create a being in need of moral development. God intended for man’s time on earth to be spent in building his moral and spiritual character in preparation for his participation in the kingdom of God. Hick asks, What sort of environment would be most conducive to soul-building? Would a world in which no evil ever confronts man be better for developing character, or would man be more likely to develop spiritually if he lived in a world where he would be confronted by problems and evil? Hick argues that the answer is obviously the latter. If God wants to use the world to build souls, he cannot place man in an Edenic paradise where nothing ever goes wrong. Consequently, there is evil in the world, but God is not to be blamed for it, since he intends to use it to build souls and ultimately develop men to a point where they are ready for the kingdom of God. Hick recognizes that if God’s purpose with the world is to build souls, many will argue he has severely failed. Evil in the world often turns people away from God rather than encouraging them to grow spiritually. Therefore, it does not seem that the evil in the world accomplishes its purpose, and God must be guilty for creating such a world. Hick answers that though it seems the souls are not being built, God will nonetheless see to it that everyone ultimately makes it to the kingdom of God. No soul will finally go unbuilt; no evil will prove to be unjustified or unjustifiable.

Note first that if we allow — as we must — Hick’s concepts of God and evil he can answer the problem of evil that confronts his theology. Some may not accept his theology as a whole, but he has shown a way to render it internally consistent. He has proved that this is one of the good possible worlds God could have created. Second, as in the preceding examples, Hick’s theodicy follows the basic strategy outlined. God was faced with two choices, neither of which could be actualized simultaneously with the other. God could remove evil from the world, but then he would not be able to build the souls of his creatures; or he could build the souls of his creatures, but then he would have to include evil in the world, for that is the way to build souls. Building souls and preparing them for the kingdom of God is a value of the first order which makes it worth the evil present in the world. However, God cannot be guilty for not removing evil, for he could not both build souls and remove evil, and no one is guilty for failing to do that which he could not.

Value of Theodicy.

Apologetics. An initial value of theodicies is that may answer the problems of evil that face the theologies for which they are constructed. Most rejections of theodicies tend to be on grounds external to the theological system, i.e., the critic refuses to adopt the intellectual commitments of the system. Such a rejection is not made on the grounds of a problem of evil, for that is always a problem of the internal consistency of a system. The theodicies presented above render their theologies internally consistent and thereby solve their problem of evil. As a result, atheists are mistaken who claim that all theistic positions are hopelessly irrational because self-contradictory on this matter. Moreover, their claims that no theist can solve his problem of evil are contradicted by the fact that many theists can do so. The ways of God are defensible, and they are defensible in such a way that no theist should have to give in to the charge of irrationality due to a problem of evil.

Intellectual Clarity.

The one who structures a theodicy must be clear about the intellectual commitments his theology entails. Each theology incorporates particular views on God, evil, and free human action. It is valuable for the theologian to understand that he works within the broad stream of Christian theism, even though his views are not necessarily identical to every other Christian theist’s.

Human Creativity.

The former benefit leads to another. Obviously, there is only one God, but there are many theologies and theodicies about that God. One of the values of theodicy making is that it helps the theologian recognize that his system is just one way of perceiving the nature of God and the world. Insofar as his views square with reality, his theology is correct; nonetheless, it is still a human construct. Consequently, when someone rejects a theology or theodicy, he is not actually rejecting God (unless the theology and theodicy accurately portray God), but rather a human construction about the nature of God and the world.

Internal Consistency.

Since the intent in writing a theodicy is to avoid self-contradiction, the theist strives to remove any potential or actual contradictions in his system. Many theologians, nonetheless, seem to do only fragments of theology, and they wind up holding views in one area that contradict views in another. Theodicy making reminds the theologian that he must think holistically and synthetically as well as analytically; and he must seek to avoid creating a theological position that contains contradiction.

J. S. FEINBERG

See also EVIL, PROBLEM OF; PAIN.

Bibliography.  M. B. Ahern, The Problem of Evil; J. S. Feinberg, Theologies and Evil; P. T. Geach, Providence and Evil; J. Hick, Evil and the God of Love; G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, tr. E. M. Huggard; J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” in Philosophy of Religion, ed. B. Mitchell; E. Madden and P. Hare, Evil and the Concept of God; M. Peterson, Evil and the Christian God; A. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil.

(from Evangelical Dictionary of Theology. Copyright © 1984 by Baker Books. Biblesoft)